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This paper reviews various theoretical approaches to cultural policy, specifically, the
National Endowments for the Arts (NEA), a federal arts funding program in the
United States. Marxist, organizational, state-centered, and cultural approaches are
reviewed regarding their relevance to the question of how ard arts, which had been con-
sidered private in the past, become a public good with the advent of the NEA? I synthe-
size state-centered and cultural approaches to explain the NEA development. Following
state-centered approach, I argue that the state initiated the NEA through its structural
capability to lead the policy formation and guide action within the policy domain.
However, following a cultural approach, I argue that the NEA is effective to the extent
the policy frame resonates with broader cultural systems cutting across the state-soci-
ety boundaries. In this process, the policy domain invites a variety of interests and
identities by which the state hegemony in defining arts as a public good is contested
and reformulated.
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INTRODUCTION
The historical development of cultural policy in the United States hardly
took the form of linear evolution. It was in the late nineteenth century that
the distinction between popular culture and high culture developed
(DiMaggio, 1982). However, the growth of the art world was a local, rather
than national, phenomenon, concentrated on major cities like Boston,
Philadelphia, and Chicago. Also, the earlier dominant model for arts organi-
zations was private proprietorship based on income through ticket sales
and individual donations. Under these earlier conditions, a full-fledged
national cultural policy treating arts as a public good did not emerge. 
The first large-scale government support for the arts took place in the
1930s. During the New Deal period, the Works Progress Administration
(WPA) art Projects began in 1935 as a part of the federal government plan-
ning to create new job chances and income for unemployed artists who
were suffering in the midst of Great Depression. However, a part of that
program, the Federal Theater Project (FTP) that produced theatrical plays as
employment opportunities for artists, resulted in serious controversies.
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Whereas artists “dedicated to the principle that the theater was both a vehi-
cle for entertainment and a means of social enlightenment” (Mankin, 1995:
84), government officials who concentrated on solving unemployment prob-
lems could not bear the political and social criticisms the FTP plays con-
tained. The project ended in 1943 with a heritage of deep distrust between
artists and politicians, which prevented the formation of wide-scale public
support for the arts for decades. 
In 1965, Congress passed a bill to establish a National Foundation for the
Arts and Humanities. The crucial part of this program was the National
Endowments for the Arts (NEA) designed to provide artists and arts organi-
zations with public support. However, the NEA defined the problems with-
in a broader context where the arts became a public matter. The NEA’s goal
was the promotion of the quality of public life through supporting the arts.
Furthermore, in comparison with the past, the NEA enjoyed significant
bipartisan supports until the late 1980s. “In the 1930s, it took courage for a
politician to speak out in defense of Federal One; in the 1970s, it takes no
courage at all for a politician to praise NEA” (Netzer, 1980: 62). On the
other, most arts organizations before the 1960s were private enterprises root-
ed in localities. Being uncomfortable with the state interference in the arts,
they originally resisted the government’s attempt to transform the arts into
public matters.1 Yet, once the NEA was implemented, a dramatic change
occurred in their attitude. Although the percentage of the NEA budget in
total federal spending remained small, the budget increase and its legitimiz-
ing effect significantly influenced the art worlds both symbolically and real-
istically. The level of competition and dependency on public funds among
arts groups increased since the inception of the NEA.2
The NEA was sharply distinguishable from the past policies in the sense
that both governmental and non-governmental groups could get benefits
and achieve authority only by actively participating in the policymaking
process. Drawing on the discontinuity between the past cultural policies
and the NEA, we can raise the following questions. How did which had
been private activities, become a unique object deserving special public
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1 This was well exemplified by the opposition of 91 percent of the board chairmen of the
nation’s five symphony orchestras to public subsidy of the arts in 1953 (Cummings, 1995: 110).
2 Plus, the expansion of the arts world, part of which is due to the increasing public funds,
made the competition more intense. According to a report submitted by the Presidential Task
Force on the arts and Humanities in 1981, since the NEA was founded, the number of profes-
sional arts organizations has grown by almost 700 percent. “Professional orchestras have
increased from 58 to 145; professional opera companies from 31 to 109; professional dance
companies from 35 to 250; professional theater companies from 40 to 500” cited from Mulchay
(1987: 327).
attentions and governmental treatment? How could the past antagonistic
relationship between the arts and the government disappear and the new
national cultural policy, in which regularized interactions between govern-
mental and non-governmental groups take place, appear? The answers to
these empirical questions entail the general issues raised by policymaking
process. First, to understand the change of the manner in which the arts are
perceived by policymakers, we must consider social forces that make possi-
ble the shift of the policy framework by which certain sets of problems are
detected and solutions to the problems are proposed in a specific manner.
Secondly, to understand the change in relationships between the govern-
ment and the arts, we should take into account the formation of the system
of the policy domain, which consists of social relations and practices that
put the policy framework into action. Given that cultural policy occupies
both a unique dimension and part of general state-formation, this paper will
investigate both the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches to
public policies in their application to the study of cultural policy. In next
parts, this paper will review four approaches: Marxist, organizational, state-
centered, and cultural approaches. 
MARXIST APPROACHES
In orthodox Marxist narrative, the state is regarded as “a committee for
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx, 1986: 226)
State policy is functional for existing social order in such a way that the poli-
cy is fundamentally shaped by capitalists’ pressure on policymaking.
Gramsci (1994) argues that the modern state reproduces the existing social
order not by mere domination but by hegemony through which the state
induces people to accept the capitalist social order as morally right. Here,
cultural policy can be seen as a hegemonic apparatus to force the dominated
class to internalize the conformist values through the inculcation of high
culture: government’s cultural program pacifies social tensions (Berman,
1979) and preserves social order by creating national identity (Becker, 1984:
181) 
Criticizing the instrumentalist approaches, Neo-Marxists define the state
as independent of economic arena. Poulantzas (1973) argues that state poli-
cy is not directly controlled by capitalists’ interests but by the functionalist
logic of systems. The state is understood as “the factor of cohesion of a
social formation and the factor of reproduction of the conditions of produc-
tion of a system.” (Poulantzas, 1973: 246). Thus, the state equipped with its
own staffs and projects is able to maintain the capitalist system and, thus,
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exercise so called, “relative autonomy”, which allows the specific dynamics
within each policy. Recent cultural policy studies emphasize the specific
form of politics peculiar to cultural technologies adopted by the state. Then,
cultural policy is a specific governmental technology aiming to improve cer-
tain “mental or behavioral attributes of the general population-usually as
parts of programs of citizen formation (Bennett, 1992: 28). Indeed, the gov-
ernmental support for artistic activities is often justified by the premise that
“people of all classes and backgrounds desire and respond to the opportuni-
ty to experience the arts” as well as health and education (Arian, 1992: 62). 
Criticizing Poulantza as functionalist, Skocpol argues that state policies
are not necessarily “functional for the system maintenance”. On the con-
trary, “political struggles and state actions in capitalist democracies can
actually stimulate or accelerate challenges to capitalist prerogatives from
below.” (Skocpol, 1980: 178) She takes the example of “the National
Industrial Recovery Act” (NIRA) during the New Deal period, which conse-
quently empowered industrial labor unions and intensified conflicts among
workers, businessmen, and politicians. According to her, Poulantzasian
approach is seen as tautological as with Marxist approaches in that the
direction of policy is to be determined, in the final instance, by the demand
of the capitalist interests. Hence, Marxist approaches hardly give cultural
policy its own dimension because the overall policy direction is determined
by the overarching capitalist interest or system demand for equilibrium
rather than by its internal dynamics and logic. It should be noted that state
policies interlock with social forces outside the state, which in turn compli-
cate the dynamics and modify the logic of policymaking. This is the issue
the next part investigates.
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES
Traditional liberal-pluralist approaches allow for the analysis of state poli-
cies’ interlocking with social forces outside the state. Social groups create
organizations to pursue their interests, which in turn stimulate others to cre-
ate their own organizations (Truman, 1951). These groups make policies
favorable to their interests by activities like lobbying, picketing, mailing, etc.
Thus, pluralist approaches shed a light on complex and contradictory char-
acteristics of policymaking, which depend on the nature of various social
groups’ interests and goals. 
However, these approaches tend to assume that the marginal costs of
political participation are evenly distributed across different actors. Because
of the differences in resources and access to power, individuals have differ-
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ent chances of forming organizations and thus influencing policymaking
process (Olson, 1965). Opposing the traditional pluralist view, recent
researches emphasize role of the state that directs interest group activities
and render resources for the maintenance of the organizations (Scholzman
and Tierney, 1983; Walker, 1983). Here, the centrality is given to the state
activities such as legislation and policies that provide interest groups with
chances to reduce the transaction cost. Lauman and Knoke (1987) criticize
that the pluralist approach focuses too much on “the more formalized
aspects of legislation” neglecting the causal mechanisms of organizational
participation, that is, “how interest groups pursue their policy objectives.”
Instead of focusing on isolated conditional factors that affect interests,
Lauman and Knoke attribute the cause of interest group activities to
“network structures among organized interest groups for the exchange of
timely policy information and politically useful material resources essential
to coalition-formation, influence mobilization, and bargaining-negotiation
processes that ultimately create state policies.” (Laumann and Knoke, 1987:
7) This attention to network structures leads to the emphasis on the speci-
ficity of the policy domain. Suggesting that network structures vary across
policy domains, Lauman and Knoke argue that it is the policy-specific
forces that condition policy processes, not general society-wide forces such
as ideologies and class structure. 
According to organizational approaches, the uniqueness of cultural policy
is given by its unique configuration of social networks in the cultural policy
domain, not from the unique characteristics of the policy object, that is, the
arts or culture. For organizational approaches, the object of cultural policy,
the arts or culture is absorbed into the abstract organizational activities like
the pursuit of interests, exchange of information and resources. In so doing,
they attribute the policy framework to the closed system of the policy
domain at a given moment, and, thus, do not account for how a new frame-
work can emerge in the first place and continue to restructure the system of
the policy domain. According to Knoke (1990: 21), only by “[situating] the
normative processes in concrete entities and ongoing relationships among
social actor”, the analysts can “capture the dynamics among purposive
political actors who are constrained to accept, reject, and innovate new
norms of behavior.” However, actors do not enter the policy domain with
bare hands. Actors can be equipped with “pre-understanding” of the situa-
tion, which itself often motivates actors to participate in the policy domain.
Therefore, the conceptual framework that provides cognitive guidelines for
actors can be prior to the policy domain. 
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STATE-CENTERED APPROACHES
According to organizational approaches, the state can acquire the power
only by embedding itself within the policy domain giving out information
and resources to other actors within the network (Knoke, 1990; 1985: 21).
However, proposing a more institutional view on the state, Skocpol argues
that “[S]tates matter … because their organizational configurations, along
with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage
some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not oth-
ers), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not oth-
ers).”
Here, the state not as a powerful actor but as a rule-binding institution
plays a constitutive role in constructing and influencing the organizational
network as a whole. Given that policymaking is part of state-formation that
involves the overall reproduction of the state structure and the state-society
relation, the specific policy should be positioned within the configuration of
the state activities in general. State-centered approaches articulate the genet-
ic logic of policymaking in terms of the effects of the state activities on the
development of the policy domain. Yet, state-centered institutional
approaches cannot fully account for what conditions made possible the cre-
ation of policy in the first place. A stronger state-centered argument may
provide the answer by giving a centrality to the state with respect to policy-
making process. It would assume that the state as a capable organization
has initiatives not only for policymaking process but also for the creation of
the policy itself (DeViney, 1983; Field and Higley, 1980; Skocpol, 1985).
According to Skocpola, “extranational orientations of states, the challenges
they may face in maintaining domestic order, and the organizational
resources that collectivities of state officials may be able to draw on and
deploy [are] … features of the state [which] help to explain autonomous
state action” (p. 9)
Based on its capability as a bureaucratic organization equipped with effi-
cient means, the state has the structural capacity to formulate the policy
framework that defines the problems and prescribes solutions. In this con-
text, cultural policy can be seen as the state’s conscious project that bears on
the issues of the arts, which is planned to serve to the goal of the state. For
example, Zukin (1982) argues that the governmental support for the arts is
derived from the state’s political and economic goal to create political con-
stituencies, to make propaganda for the American way of life, and to benefit
from the development of an arts infrastructure, etc.
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However, this raises another question about the sources of the policy
framework from which the state formulate ideas. The explanation of the
sources is given by the notion of “policy legacies” whereby policymakers
derive their action templates from previous policy (Heclo, 1974; Weir and
Skocpol, 1985). Yet, overemphasizing “continuity” (Weir and Skocpol, 1985:
125), the notion of “policy legacies” cannot account for how policymakers
come up with a new framework that modifies policymaking in a fresh man-
ner. Why should the solution to the problem be no other than the arts or cul-
ture in the first place? The weakness of the notion of policy legacies lies in
its inability to reveal the threshold around which the focus of the issues
shifts. 
CULTURAL APPROACHES
State-centered approaches associate the policy framework mainly with
the state autonomy. However, according to Hall (1993), the shift from
Keynesian to monetarist modes of policymaking in Britain during the 1970s
and early 1980s took place “not as a result of autonomous action, but in
response to an evolving societal debate that soon became bound up with
electoral competition.” (Hall, 1993: 288) He emphasizes the role of political
parties and media that stand at “the intersection between the sate and soci-
ety” in diffusing new models and drawing broader participation. By refer-
ring only to “ideas”, “the subjectivity of the state officials”, state-centered
approaches cannot account for the goal changes (Steinmetz, 1999).
According to state-centered approaches, new policy comes only from the
state official’s ideas because they hardly “[resort] to any “societal” factors to
help state actions” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 236). Here, cultural systems,
“systems of meaning and the practices in which [state officials] are embed-
ded” (Steinmetz, 1999: 7), can be a main source of ideas cutting across the
state-society boundary. Steinmetz argues that state-centered approaches
“reject or marginalize the role of cultural determination of the state…,
because most of what we call culture in the anthropological sense is located
on the “society” side” (Steinmetz, 1999: 17).3 As a result, state-centered
approaches ignore broader, impersonal cultural systems that are not orga-
nized as formal bodies of technocratic thought adopted by the state via
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3 According to Steinmetz, state-centered approaches do consider the role of culture in link-
ing the state and society yet in quite a limited sense. He argues that “[t]here was some interest
in what Skocpol called the “Tocquevillian” problem of the state’s “patterning of social con-
flict”. But here again culture is figured primarily as an effect and not a determinant of the
state.” (Steinmetz, 1999: 17) 
“means-end frameworks”. 
Cultural approaches argue that the cultural systems institutionalized in
broader contexts define the role of the state and specific logic of policy
domain because “social practices and objects such as states or state officials
have to be situated in specific historical and cultural settings”(Dobbin, 1993;
Friedland and Alford, 1991; Steinmetz, 1999: 23). Consequently, the policy-
making process is rooted in “the institutional structure of society which
shapes the rule by which resources are accumulated, transformed into
capacities for action, and made available as motives by which that action is
made meaningful” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 238). Thus, in the analysis
of cultural policy, we should trace the historical development of specific cul-
tural assumptions that mold the policymaking process at a given moment.
The activation of national cultural policy is based on the belief that “govern-
ment has a say in the shape of a country’s culture and that nations are val-
ued and identified by their cultural characteristics” (Dominguez, 2000: 23).
What underlies this belief is the assumption that culture is not private and
local phenomenon but public and national property. In short, it is not until
the emergence and institutionalization of specific cultural systems that ulti-
mately make the arts a public matter, the state can initiate cultural policy to
promote the nation’s cultural life.
On the other hand, the broad cultural systems, which give the policy
framework meaning, inevitably constrain and shape the mode of the state
autonomy. According to Habermas, “the state cannot simply take over the
cultural system and […] in fact, the expansion of areas for state planning
creates problems for things that are culturally taken for granted.”
(Habermas, 1989: 277). In democratic society, the public value of the arts
inevitably entails the logic of cultural democracy assuming that people of all
classes desire and respond to the opportunity to experience the arts. Then,
the arts become a crucial element that constitutes citizenship in terms of
rights. Indeed, new social movements can emerge armed with the logic of
cultural democracy demanding equal access and freedom of expression in
the area of the arts as shown in the growth of minority cultural organiza-
tions since the 1960s.
State-centered approaches often neglect this ironic aspect of the state
intervention since they over-emphasize the strength of the state defined
mostly in non-cultural terms. Since the state is equipped with bureaucratic
rationality, the state can exercise significant effects on the formation of the
policy domain. However, cultural approaches argue that the extent and
mode of the state autonomy is conditioned by cultural systems outside the
state. Hence, the policymaking process and the formation of the policy
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domain are hardly dictated by the state only. Cultural systems both enable
and constrain policymaking in the sense that they provide discourses for
both legitimation and politicization for actors within and without the state
at a given moment. 
THE NEA 
Although this paper focused on cultural policy formation, it can be
argued that the theoretical effectiveness of specific theoretical approaches in
explaining the policy formation in general depends on the configuration of
the state-society relationships, mediated by the policy framework pertaining
to the policy-making process in question. Each policy formation is charac-
terized by particular relationships between the initiative of the state, the
clarity of goal definition, and the organizational strength of the participant
groups, which over-determine the state-society relations within the policy
domain and the legitimacy of policy framework guiding the policy-making
process. Which theory better explains the policy formation depends on the
relationships of the various factors: the state can over-power the participant
groups and lead the whole policy-making process, which makes state-cen-
tered approaches relevant; the interests of social groups and their relations
can override the state authority, which makes organizational approaches rel-
evant; the capitalist interest can permeate overall policy-making process,
which makes Marxist approaches relevant; the hegemonic symbol systems
can define the discursive contents of policy framework, which makes cul-
tural approaches relevant.
This paper argues that the cultural and state-centered approaches are bet-
ter equipped with theoretical tools than Marxist and organizational
approaches in explaining the formation of cultural policy in the United
States. Cultural policy formation is understood as sociohistorical processes
that involve complex development of state-society relations. Therefore, the
dimension of time must be incorporated into the explanatory frame. Yet, for
Marxist approaches, the direction of cultural policy is relatively constant in
terms of its function for the reproduction of the capitalist order, and the sys-
tem of the policy domain reflects class relations. However, as I will argue
below, the cultural policy frameworks of the NEA have changed over time
as the policy domain itself has been structured by the shifting relationships
between social groups and government agencies, which were hardly
reducible to larger class relations. Although organizational approaches can
shed a light on the dynamics of the network structure in the policy domain
at a given moment, they tend to consider the nature of systems too pluralist
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and fragmented to pinpoint the causal mechanisms across time and space
that shape the social relations and the interests of participants in the cultural
policy domain. In the case of the NEA, the network structure in the cultural
policy domain was not pre-given, but initially coordinated by the state ini-
tiative and furthered as the sake regarding the arts increased along with pol-
icy development. Now, I turn to the application of state-centered and cultur-
al approaches to articulate the historical development of the NEA.
As mentioned earlier, the NEA was created in 1965 during the Johnson
administration. As state-centered approaches argue, a few elitist groups
who consciously maneuvered around the governmental institutions such as
the White House and Congress created the NEA. The NEA was possible by
the commitment of vanguards mostly comprised by the President himself, a
few Congressmen, and a small number of arts organizations that spearhead-
ed the creation of national cultural policy. The rationalization of state action
was based on the “problem-solving” framework. It was often argued that
cultural policy was necessary for economic survival of arts organizations at
the time of crisis: as deficits outran the ability of private patrons to cover
them, the government stepped in to make up the difference (Baumol and
Bowen, 1966). As a capable actor, the state could lead other actors in cultural
policy-making process by providing the sets of definition of problems and
proper solutions. 
Also, the characteristic of the state structure was illustrative in the early
period when the public arts-funding program was in the womb of time
(Cummings, 1995). During the early period of the Kennedy administration,
the attempt to create a federal art-funding program initiated by a few art
supporters in Congress, individual artists and arts organizations. However,
a bill to establish a Federal Advisory Council on the arts was blocked in
1961 and 1962. Naturally, the supporters for the program focused more on
the president’s side, which consequently made possible the creation of
“Special Consultant to the President for the arts”. Finally, they succeeded in
forcing the president to issue the executive order to create the Advisory
Council. 
The state’s initiative for cultural policy-making is also well shown along
the development of the system of the policy domain. Indeed, there was
hardly a collective force outside the state that pushed the foundation of cul-
tural policy in their pursuit of interests. Although the number of arts organi-
zations in the 1960s was increasing at high rate, they were not well-orga-
nized interest groups at all. The support for the NEA from the art worlds
was far from univocal in the early period regarding the foundation of
national cultural policy. It was the NEA itself that helped the development
70 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
of political mobilization and networks of interaction among arts organiza-
tions that would consequently strengthen the system of the cultural policy
domain (Wyszomirski, 1995). Especially under the leadership of Nancy
Hanks as Chairman of the NEA (1969-1977), who recognized the initial
weakness of the arts policy system, the NEA started to “develop the weak
and divided art community into a coordinated and politically effective con-
stituency” (Wyszomirski, 1995: 54). Starting in 1970, the NEA promoted the
organizational strength of the art worlds by supporting arts service organi-
zations and national association of arts organizations like OPERA America.
This action also entailed the expansion of governmental sub-units in charge
of public art funding like the National Assembly of States Arts Agencies.
Before the foundation of the NEA, only four states had art-funding agencies.
However, by 1980, all states had founded art agencies owing to the NEA’s
block grants that had allocated certain amount of grants to states. “This
snowball of state and federal art funding, in turn led to the formation of
more than 3,000 local art councils, a quarter of which were organized as
units of local government while the remaining three quarters were formed
as nonprofits organizations, often with some formal link to local govern-
ment.”(Kreidler, 2000: 152) This formation of sub-government units con-
tributed to the expansion of public art-funding programs to local levels and,
thus, made the NEA a truly national cultural policy. 
This development of the NEA not only gathered social groups into the
policy domain. The development of the NEA’s art-funding program did
spur the formation of social networks, which prompted exchanges of infor-
mation, formed reputation, and distributed common ideology among arts
organizations in an effort to secure resources centralized around the state
(DiMaggio, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1992). Also on the part of politicians, as a
result of the NEA’s expansion, the arts could become to be perceived as
“politically saleable”, and, thus, came to enjoy a significant extent of con-
gressional support. In this process, so called, “cozy iron triangles”, which
consisted of congressional subcommittee, art agencies, and arts organiza-
tions, emerged within the cultural policy domain during the 1970s.
However, the system of the policy domain is hardly static over time. Rather,
it is open to change depending on the shift of policy characteristics, which is
often led by the government. For example, in the 1980s, the cozy iron trian-
gle system exploded into the field of intense competition due to the Reagan
administration’s threat of a cut in the NEA’s budget, which changed the pol-
icy into more redistributive one. (Wyszomirski, 1995: 60-72). Although the
actual budget cut was smaller than expected, as a result of the rally of the
alliance of congressional supporters, arts organizations, and the art agencies
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to protect the NEA, the NEA could no longer expect as high increases as in
the past. With the increased number of arts organization and their high
dependency on the NEA, this change intensified competition among arts
organizations, which decreased the relative proportion of federal funding in
the art support system. On the other hand, the government itself could not
be free of conflicts. Conflicts within the government have emerged along-
side the development of the sub-governmental organizations, that is, state
and local art agencies, whose interests were in the allocation of resources
and power in cultural policy-making process. During the 1970s, “the state
agencies grew in size, experience, and managerial capacity” and, by 1975,
they “challenged [the NEA] vigorously, demanding more flexible guidelines
for the funds they regranted, more influence in developing guidelines, and
symbolic acceptance as partners, rather than subordinates, in the policy
process” (DiMaggio, 1991: 219). In this sense, it can be argued that the NEA
not only made possible the formation of social groups but also influenced
the manner in which they interact with one another through so called
“Topcquevillian effects” of the state.
As argued so far, the state approaches provide theoretical tools for analyz-
ing the initial conditions for the creation of the NEA and the development
of the system of the cultural policy domain. However, state-centered
approaches tend to neglect broad sociocultural contexts in which policy-
making process is embedded. Focusing exclusively on the problem-solving
capacity of the state, state-centered approaches are unable to articulate the
whole sets of the framework of the cultural policy that goes beyond the
issue of financial difficulty or arts organizations. Financial difficulties
always existed and, in fact, the difficulties like increases in labor costs were
prompted by the availability of institutional funding rather than by eco-
nomic pressure, which were already operating in the 1960s (Netzer, 1980).
Even if this story is true, why “the cost disease should have required whole-
sale public assistance in the 1960s” is not explained (DiMaggio, 1987: 202-3).
It must be noted that there was another principle that rationalized the NEA
based on the notion of “art for art”. Here, the usefulness of the arts refers to
the benefit that the arts provide for the public as a distinct object that con-
cerns the cultural life of the country. Compared to the past policy experi-
ences like WPA projects where the arts were regarded as one of economic
problems caused by Great Depression this principle went beyond the prob-
lem-solving frame in a technical sense. Furthermore, the past antagonistic
relation between the arts world and the state caused by the government’s
direct intervention in the arts provided a negative reference for the new pro-
gram. From the beginning, policymakers endeavored to separate the politics
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from the decision-making process of the NEA. The National Foundation on
the arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 actually states that “in the adminis-
tration of this act no department, agency, officer, or employee of the United
States shall exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the policy
determination, personnel, curriculum, or the administration or operation of
any school or non-Federal agency, institution, organization, or association.”
This separation was institutionally possible by the advisory panel system
of the NEA, whose tasks were “to review applicants submitted under estab-
lished guidelines and categories; to recommend alterations within the estab-
lished guidelines and categories from year to year; to recommend shifts in
funding between categories; and to recommend shifts in programs in the
light of experience and the developing needs of the arts” (Straight, 1979: 77).
Most of the panel advisors consisted of the prestigious members of the arts
world because it was assumed that the value of the arts was to be judged
most correctly by the professionals. So the principle was “let the profession-
al judge not bureaucrats or politicians”. Although the NEA has functioned
as the paramount agency that exercised significant influence on the art
world, it hardly took the form of a unified bureaucracy like a ministry of
culture: the NEA claimed itself as a “program” that was supposedly run by
professional judgments, and not by political commands. As such, the policy-
making process was insulated from political pressure and, thus, clashes
between artists and the state officials and politicians that had happened in
the past could be avoided in advance.
In short, “respect for the arts” was the critical rational that constituted the
rule of the NEA program. Indeed, this was a new policy framework which
inherited no legacies from the past policies. Whereas the notion of “policy
legacies” assumes continuity between the past and the present, the NEA
case shows a case whereby the past experience channels the efforts of poli-
cymakers to the alternative by adopting the new policy framework and,
thus, avoiding the problems in the previous policies. Although state-cen-
tered approaches can reveal the structural features that condition the initia-
tion of the policy framework and the development of the policy domain,
putting emphasis exclusively on the state autonomy, they tend to isolate
policymaking process from broad social contexts. As a result, without
resorting to the state officials’ “idea”, state-centered approaches cannot
account for the origin of the policy framework, which molds the extent and
mode of the state autonomy in policymaking process at a given moment.
What we need here is a story that illustrates the sociocultural process
through which the arts become to be perceived by the state in a specific
manner as a policy object.
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Cultural approaches argue that the emergence of the policy framework is
possible due to the historically specific cultural systems by which policy-
makers are enabled to define the problems and solutions. In the case of the
NEA, the question is how specific perspective toward the arts, not as one
among many economic activities but as the arts sui generis, emerged
through sociohistorical process and was consequently adopted in policy-
making process. Therefore, first we need to understand what had happened
before the NEA 
Until the establishment of the NEA, organized, direct and on-going public
support for the arts did not exist in the United States. As mentioned earlier,
it was due to the fact that the artistic activities took place in private and
local settings. However, this did not mean that the operation of art business
was based on purely market-oriented enterprises. The financial difficulty of
arts organizations was an almost permanent phenomenon in the American
art scene. The only solutions that offset the difficulties were private philan-
thropy from art lovers and artists’ acceptance of discounted compensation
for their labor (Kreidler, 2000). They regarded the arts as worthy of their
commitment regardless of the short-term economic reward they could get
from their investment into the arts. In short, for them, the arts were cultural
capital, “knowledge and familiarity with styles and genres that are socially
valued and that confer prestige upon those who have mastered them”
(Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio, 1982: 43). Due to the institutionalization of cul-
tural capital in social structure, the arts were not seen simply as a political
tool that fixed social hierarchy by excluding the lower class from the table of
“good taste”. The core principle that managed arts organizations was the
myth of “the glorification of the arts”, which legitimized hegemonic social
order dominated by moral and cultural superiority of urban elites over the
others. Within this sociocultural setting, the perception that there is such a
thing as “high culture”, something superior to other profane area of life was
established.
Although the glorification of the arts originated in local scenes, it extend-
ed to the national level by the 1930s. According to DiMaggio (2000), this
process involved three aspects: (1) the systematic construction of national
organizational fields such as the national networks of art professionals e.g.
the American Association of Museums, which established and diffused the
national standard of high culture; (2) the incorporation of the arts into edu-
cational institutions, which played a key role in validating and disseminat-
ing high cultural canons; and (3) the role of commercial cultural industries
such as radio broadcasting, which provided a secular contrast to the sacred
offerings of the arts and, at the same time, exposed to broader publics high
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culture. Therefore, it is not surprising that even before the 1960s, the 1920s
and the 1930s witnessed a sharp increase in the number of art professionals,
audiences, both middle- and upper-class, and arts organizations (DiMaggio,
2000: 45). As a result, at the national level, the arts became a thing of value
that behooved people to invoke arts to prove their cultural excellence. The
glorification of the arts convinced more people, especially an emerging mid-
dle class that invest into the arts could be rewarding. By the 1950s, the
development of nonprofit arts activities that replaced the high art propri-
etorships showed the peak of the national institutionalization of cultural
capital. Indeed, it was not strongly bounded urban elites but the middle-
class, who appeared to the front due to the destruction of family capitalism
that had maintained the nonprofit arts organizations in the form of expand-
ed personal contribution and trustees (DiMaggio, 2000). 
Interestingly, the glorification of the arts did not fade away from the
change in class structure, that is, the replacement of urban elites by “a
national elite, detached from loyalty of place, whose authority rests on
bureaucratic command rather than on kinship; club life, or [local] culture.”
(DiMaggio, 2000: 48) DiMaggio argues that due to these changes in social
structure “the high culture system has been eroding, and with it the strong
classification between a sacred high culture and its profane popular coun-
terpart.” However, in the 1960s, the national institutionalization of cultural
capital forced the public to participate in more intensive symbolic struggles
than ever before. As Meyer and Strang argue (1993), the more societies were
organized as nation-states, and not as aggregation of local groups but as
sum of free individuals, the more cultural categories, in this case, the glorifi-
cation of the arts, diffused among and within them. With the universalized
myth of the arts, the construction of the self as a unique being became a pro-
ject on which the middle-class consumers constantly work. Therefore, the
change in social structure merely opened for the broad public more chances
of claiming the cultural superiority through the engagement in the arts. 
By the 1960s, it was the national expansion of the glorification of the arts
that incorporated the arts into the public life as a crucial arena and readied
them for the public agenda. The institutionalization of cultural capital at the
national level reinforced and disseminated the perception that the arts
embody the area of cultural life and, thus, needs public supports beyond
market revenue. Hence, the establishment of the NEA would not be possi-
ble without the cultural assumptions and discursive structures institutional-
ized in cultural systems at a given moment, which eventually transformed
the arts into a public matter. Furthermore, the logic of cultural democracy
that constituted the policy framework of the NEA can be understood in this
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historical context. In the 1960s’, monopolization that had dominated the
past American art scene apparently weakened due to the structural change.
Yet, hegemony was still working, this time not for urban elites but for
national elites — well-educated middle-and upper-classes, art professionals,
and institutional supporters for the arts such as the government and corpo-
rate foundations — which would appropriate high culture in a universalist
term like “for nation and the public”. Therefore, it can be argued that, ironi-
cally, the logic of cultural democracy that assumed all citizens’ equal right in
appropriating and expressing creativity was derived from the need of hege-
mony on the part of national elites who had the leading voice in this trans-
formation. New social hierarchy was to be sustained only by universalist
cultural idioms, of which contradiction was reflected in the principle of the
NEA policy — the emphasis on both access, the logic of cultural democracy,
and “excellence”, the superiority of high culture or the arts.
On the other hand, the explanation of the state’s motivation is possible by
incorporating cultural policy into the general process of state-formation,
specifically the expansion of the American state, which started in the 1930s.
Indeed, one aspect of cultural policy was based on the state’s attempt of
problem solving, that is, the correction of the market mechanisms, as seen in
the past WPA project. However, WPA project failed since consequently it
was a financial help for small groups of professionals who eventually
turned their back on the government. Therefore, the other aspect, which
entailed the legitimate framework of communication for the participants in
policymaking process, was needed for cultural policy to be activated effec-
tively. Even in the NEA’s case, public subsidy for financially suffering artists
and arts organizations was the fundamental motivation on the part of the
state. Yet, the very legitimation aspect was what made the NEA possible
and effective. The NEA policy goals consisted of the logic of cultural democ-
racy — intended to expand public access to, and benefit from, cultural
opportunities — which were in the process of institutionalization in socio-
cultural hegemonic order at a given moment, and, therefore, provided the
legitimate framework for the state’s intervention in culture. 
Yet, this legitimation aspect of the policy framework seldom stabilizes
cultural policymaking process. According to cultural approaches, only
because the NEA mobilized discourses rooted in cultural systems to ratio-
nalize its action, it inevitably spurred society-wide concerns about policy-
making process. Therefore, the legitimate policy framework not only
enables but also constrains the system of cultural policy. By mobilizing the
logic of cultural policy, the NEA, along its development, articulated and
politicized the cultural area of public life and stimulated more claims of cul-
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tural rights from various segments of the population, especially from those
who had been alienated from the past sociocultural hegemonic order. 
In fact, in the early period of the NEA, the logic of cultural democracy
was largely a “rhetorical facade” with emphasis going to the “excellence”
aspect. Existing major arts organizations such as orchestras, museums, and
theaters — who had mostly elite clients — were often given priority because
allegedly they were the ones who had been keeping the cultural heritage of
the country. Furthermore, this bias was institutionalized in the judging sys-
tem: the advisory panels, which decided the allocation of grants, consisted
of members related directly or indirectly to major arts organizations.
However, as the NEA grew in size during the 1970s and its funding turned
into “an official seal of approval”, it was followed by the criticism that “[the
NEA]’s devolution to the arts disciplines (through the advisory panels)
came to look like a “closed circle of cultural cognoscente” practicing “crony-
ism” in the distribution of the “cultural pork barrel.” (Mulchay, 1995: 211)
On the other, in the regular reauthorization processes in Congress,
Congressmen who were naturally conscious of their constituencies continu-
ously raised “access” issues. Eventually both policymakers and arts organi-
zations put the access principle into action and, thus, the logic of cultural
democracy did contribute to the efforts to balance the NEA’s allocation of
grants. As part of these efforts, in 1973 the NEA established “expansion art
program” to support culturally disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups and
small arts organizations rooted in local communities. 
This tension between “access” and “excellence” exploded in the public
debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. NEA was caught in the middle of
fierce, broad public debates when it funded works by Andres Serrano and
an exhibition of photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe judged by critics as
anti-Christian and pornographic. The crucial axis of the debate was again
about “whether NEA grants should be awarded on the basis of artistic
excellence alone, as defined by the professional the art world or whether
NEA grants should seek to develop the social and political values of cultur-
al democratization, greater access by people of different cultures, ethnicities,
and greater accessibility in all geographic locations” (Mulchay, 1995: 175).
Encompassing various issues of obscenity and censorship, public account-
ability and artistic freedom, and access and excellence, this event challenged
the previous dominance of the major arts organizations and their ideology
of professionalism in favor of “access, education, and public responsibility”.
As a result, previously marginal actors like state or local art agencies and
small local arts organizations came to be empowered and, thus, act more
actively in the cultural policy domain. 
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Thus, cultural policy does not guarantee the system maintenance as
Marxist approaches argue. Cultural policy once activated can encourage
various parties to participate and stimulates public disputes over arts and
culture. Since the early 1980s when welfare policies were under attack by
monetarist policy paradigms, it was the very legitimation aspect of the NEA
that was continuingly questioned. The problem was whether or not money
was used for right causes rather than whether or not money was used effi-
ciently. As the logic of cultural democracy has expanded, arts organizations
have been attempting to establish their roots in the communities “by
expanding their traditional audience base, then by inserting the arts into a
variety of social and civic contexts well beyond the aesthetic realm to which
the arts community has traditionally confined itself.” (Larson, 1997: 81) In
this process, the “arts for arts” principle has lost its appeal and the nonprofit
art sector has been dominated by the need to translate the value of the arts
into more general civic, social, and educational terms that will be more
readily understood, by the general public and by their elected officials
alike.” (p.81) As such, the NEA prompted the replacement of old cultural
categories by new ones, and furthered and complicated the logic of cultural
democracy, which accentuated wide cultural struggles across state-society
boundaries. 
DISCUSSION
The arts groups were not organized and the stake regarding the distribu-
tion of resources was low at the time when the NEA was launched, which
naturally gave the state the initial leverage to lead the policy-making
process. The state, at the same time, drew on a hegemonic cultural system
that defined arts as deserving public attention and investment, which stim-
ulated a rapid growth of participation along the cultural policy formation.
Thus, the construction of cultural policy was a product of the state activity,
which regulated and mobilized the interaction among social groups in its
dealing with the problems raised by the arts. On the other, the state activity
was enabled and constrained by the policy framework of which legitimacy
was given by cultural systems rooted in society at a given historical
moment. 
The initiation of the NEA in the 1960s was solely neither a problem-solv-
ing rational reaction to the financial difficulties of arts organizations nor a
growing government intervention to exercise control over population based
on the state elite’s intellectual blueprint. Rather, it was both an intervention
in and a reaction to the emerging arts system. First, cultural policy was an
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intervention in that the state, “makes a decisive contribution to the produc-
tion and reproduction of the instruments of construction of social reality”, in
this case, “the arts as national cultural capital” (Bourdieu, 1999: 68).
According to hom, “through the framing it imposes upon practices, the state
establishes and inculcates common forms and categories of perception and
appreciation, social frameworks of perceptions, of understanding or of
memory, in short state forms of classification. It thereby creates the conditions
for a kind of immediate orchestration of habituses which is itself the foun-
dation of a consensus over this set of shared evidences constitutive of
(national) common sense” (Bourdieu, 1999: 68). In this sense, the NEA made
the arts a public issue by diffusing the popular belief that arts were the cru-
cial part of the nation’s life. 
On the other hand, the NEA was a response to cultural systems that pro-
vided the definition of the arts as a distinctive cultural aspect of public life
in which the government should engage. The state power of symbolic classi-
fication does not stem from its organizational strength alone. In order for
the state to act not only efficiently but also meaningfully, it must resort to
broader cultural systems instituted in society. “State policies are not only
technical solutions to material problems of control or resource extraction;
they are rooted in changing conceptions of what the state is, what it can and
should do … State power is rooted not only in the technologies of coercion
and control, but in its symbolic organization” (Friedland and Alford, 1991:
237-8). Here, state-formation inevitably involves the dimension of meaning.
To become a capable actor, the state must resort to the definition of capabili-
ty, which is to be shared and represented by actors both within and without
the state.
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